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Only one year after its now famous judgment on the South
African withdrawal from the International Criminal Court, the
South African High Court has once again demonstrated that it will
not shy away from directly confronting the government in an
important matter of foreign policy: On 1 March 2018, the Court
decided that South Africa’s signing of a new protocol, intended to
strip the Southern African Development Community Tribunal
(SADC Tribunal) of its jurisdiction for individual complaints,
violates the South African constitution. While the former judgment
effectively led to withdrawal from the withdrawal and bought time
for reconsidering South Africa’s position towards the ICC, this
year’s decision appears even more ground-breaking, from the perspective of foreign
relations law, and yet has received much less attention. In the 2017 ICC withdrawal case,
the High Court found a violation of formal rules on the separation of powers in foreign
affairs. In its 2018 decision, it argued that the foreign policy decision to suspend the SADC
Tribunal violated substantive human rights. Since the Ramaphosa government
appealed the latest High Court judgment, the South African Constitutional Court will
eventually have the last word on this case. The hearings are scheduled for this Thursday,
30 August.
One Step Forward, One Step Back – The Establishment and
Dismantling of the SADC Tribunal
But how did we arrive at the 2018 High Court decision? In 2000, the SADC’s (then) 14
member states adopted a protocol (tribunal protocol) on the erection of the SADC Tribunal
which was supposed to oversee economic co-operation and integration in Southern Africa.
According to Article 15 of the tribunal protocol, the Tribunal is competent to decide disputes
between states and ‘between natural or legal persons and States’. The protocol entered
into force in 2001 when an amendment,which incorporated the protocol into the SADC
Treaty, had been adopted with the required three-quarters majority.
Not long after, though, the SADC Tribunal received some scholarly attention as a prime
example for backlash to international adjudication. In one of its first cases, the Tribunal
decided in 2008 in favour of Zimbabwean white land owners that measures based on the
violent Zimbabwean land redistribution program violated the principle of non-discrimination
on the basis of race and the right of access to justice as enshrined in the SADC Treaty.
Zimbabwe did not comply with the judgment and the white farmers were only able to
enforce a cost order against Zimbabwean property in South Africa via a 2013 decision of
the South African Constitutional Court. In the meantime, then Zimbabwean President
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Robert Mugabe and his Justice Minister successfully lobbied other SADC members to react
strongly to the 2008 judgment. Because the terms of five judges were not prolonged at
SADC summits in 2010 and 2011, the Tribunal could no longer hear new cases and was de
facto suspended. Furthermore, in 2014 nine member states including South Africa signed a
new protocol that restricted the SADC Tribunal to only hearing inter-state disputes and
thereby abandoned the individual complaints mechanism. Despite lacking one signature as
well as the ratifications necessary for its entry into force, the new protocol is regarded as
the death blow for the Tribunal because it demonstrates that the individual rights
mechanism has no future.
Violations of the SADC Treaty and the South African
Constitution
The Law Society of South Africa and others brought a claim against the South African
Presidency, the Minister of Justice and the Minister of International Relations attacking the
decisions not to appoint new judges and to sign the new protocol limiting the jurisdictional
scope of the SADC Tribunal. The High Court ruled in favour of the applicants and held
unconstitutional South Africa’s participation in suspending the SADC Tribunal and its
signing of the new protocol. Regarding the latter, it reasoned that the abolition of the
individual complaints mechanism through the President’s signature in 2014 violated the
SADC Treaty. In particular, the Court referred to the principles of human rights, democracy
and the rule of law as enshrined in Article 4 c SADC Treaty and the obligation of member
states to refrain from ‘taking any measure likely to jeopardize the sustenance of its
principles’ (Art. 6 SADC Treaty). According to the High Court, it would not be permissible to
‘emasculate a SADC organ established by the SADC Treaty itself’ (para. 64) and the
signature would demonstrate ‘South Africa’s participation in a conspiracy initiated by the
President Mugabe-regime in Zimbabwe to undermine an essential SADC Institution’s ability
to enforce a fundamental SADC objective: compliance with the Rule of Law and human
rights’ (para. 64). Furthermore, the Court held that taking the decision to adopt the new
protocol without approval of parliament violated the constitution (para. 66). The signature
would also be irrational and not justified by a legitimate governmental purpose because it
would not promote democracy, human rights and the rule of law but instead ‘sign […] away’
the Tribunal’s jurisdiction against advice from independent experts and without consultation
of the South African parliament (paras. 68, 69). Similarly, the de facto suspension decisions
from 2010 and 2011 would be in conflict with the SADC Treaty and South Africa’s
constitutional obligations (para. 67).
An Exemplar for Foreign Relations Law?
The decision is highly interesting from a foreign relations law perspective. Most recent court
decisions on foreign affairs law like the ICC withdrawal case and the Miller judgment have
focused on the division of competences between the legislature and the executive. The
South African High Court takes up this argumentative theme but key to its decision are
substantive violations of human rights. In the Court’s view, the dismantling of the individual
complaint’s mechanism of the SADC Tribunal is directed against human rights and the rule
of law and thus violates the South African constitution.
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It is easy to criticize the judgment for its scarce reasoning. For instance, the Court does not
properly explain why a violation of the SADC Treaty amounts to a violation of the South
African constitution. Moreover, it is not sufficiently substantiated why parliament has to be
involved in the decision-making process before signature of the new protocol even though
section 231 (1) of the South African constitution provides the executive with the exclusive
competence to sign international treaties. Also, one might ask why South Africa should not
be allowed to change the competences of one SADC organ when it has the power to
withdraw from the SADC Treaty as a whole (Art. 34 SADC Treaty). Furthermore, placing
such substantive limits on domestic treaty making decisions might have immense
repercussions for consent-based international law in other contexts. Applying the Court’s
(albeit scarce) reasoning, would this mean that Britain could not leave the European Court
of Justice’s jurisdiction for claims brought by individuals? Would the Latin American
withdrawals from the Inter-American Court of Human Rights be unconstitutional because
they might have repercussions for the rights enshrined in the respective domestic
constitutions?
However, the decision entails intriguing ideas for building a more principled foreign relations
law in the South African context. As has been argued on this blog, in a line of judgments the
Constitutional Court in South Africa indicated that the plea for executive foreign policy
discretion would no longer prevail in its jurisprudence. Indeed, it seems that foreign policy
decisions in South Africa should not be devoid of substantive constitutional oversight. The
South African constitution is known for granting international law a particularly strong role
when interpreting the Bill of Rights (section 39 1b South African Constitution), which might
justify treating violations of the SADC Treaty as violations of South African constitutional
rights. Furthermore, because the dismantling of the SADC Tribunal means abolishing
effective human rights protection in the SADC per se, the particular pervasive
consequences for human rights and the rule of law indeed lead to concerns from a
constitutional law perspective. Also, the applicants skillfully stress in the appeal
proceedings that the de facto suspension of the Tribunal has to be treated like a withdrawal
and that therefore parliament has to be involved. More generally, the decision
demonstrates very well that national courts might play an important part in fighting the
recent backlash against international institutions. By reminding states of their constitutional
values and obligations, domestic courts can try to protect international institutions and
judicial organs based on such values. It will be fascinating to see how the South African
Constitutional Court will position itself in the ongoing litigation.
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